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1. Introduction
The concept of a physical realization of a computational system is one of the 
key notions of both functionalism and the symbolic approach to cognitive 
science or AI (Pylyshyn 1980: 113, 1984; Chalmers 1996: 309). 
Notwithstanding a widespread consensus on the theoretical importance of 
this concept, it comes somewhat as a surprise that a precise analysis or 
shared definition does not exist yet, either in the philosophical camp, or in 
the cognitive science and AI community1. In this paper, I will present my 
attempt at such an analysis. Before doing this, however, I will say a few 
words on why I believe that a seemingly promising alternative strategy is 
misguided. 
* Postal address: Dipartimento di Pedagogia Psicologia Filosofia, via Is Mirrionis 1, 09123
Cagliari, Italy. 
1 Endicott (2005) distinguishes at least three different technical meanings of the term 
‘realization’ among philosophers. Putnam claims that “every ordinary open system is a 
realization of every abstract finite automaton” (1988: 121) and, in the same vein, Searle 
(1990) argues that any physical system can be seen to realize any computation. Both 
Putnam’s and Searle’s arguments are clearly flawed (Chalmers 1996), but they do show 
that a precise explication of the notion of realization of a computational system is badly 
needed. 
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According to this strategy, both a computational system and its multiple 
physical realizations are to be thought as dynamical systems2, and the 
realization relation is then analyzed as a special kind of structure preserving 
mapping from the state space of the computational system into the state 
space of the physical one (Giunti 1997: ch. 1; for a similar approach, see 
Fano et al. 2014). As the same kind of structure preserving mapping (i.e., an 
emulation function)3 may very well exist between a single computational 
system and many physical systems, it might seem that we have a clearcut 
explanation of the basic feature of the realization relation, namely, multiple 
(low level) realizability of the same (high level) system. 
However, there are two main reasons why the realization relation 
cannot be analyzed in terms of some form of emulation of a computational 
system by a physical one. The first is that emulation is a structure preserving 
mapping between two mathematical systems (i.e., dynamical systems), and 
thus this kind of approach merely shifts the problem, for the realizing 
system (the physical one) is not a real or concrete system, but another 
mathematical or abstract system. So the question now is: what is a 
realization of a physical system? This question is not unsolvable in 
principle, but the only solution I can think of is subscribing to a form of 
Platonism, according to which at least some mathematical systems (those at 
the lowest level) are real. 
Second, the emulation based strategy provides us with an in principle 
solution, which makes us think of realization as a relation between two 
dynamical systems — a high level computational system on the one hand, 
and a low level physical one on the other. However, no one would maintain 
that we could in fact know the details of the low level physical system, for 
2 Giunti and Mazzola (2012: Definition 1) define a deterministic dynamical system on any 
time model L = (T, +) that satisfies the minimal requirement of being a monoid, as follows. 
DS is a dynamical system on L := DS is a pair (M, (gt)t∈T) and L is a pair (T, +) such that 
(i) L = (T, +) is a monoid. Any t ∈ T is called a duration of the system, T is called its time 
set, and L its time model; (ii) M is a non-empty set. Any x ∈ M is called a state of the 
system, and M is called its state space; (iii) (gt)t∈T is a family indexed by T of functions 
from M to M. For any t ∈ T, the function gt is called the state transition of duration t 
(briefly, t-transition, or t-advance) of the system; (iv) for any v, t ∈ T, for any x ∈ M, 
(a) g0(x) = x, where 0 is the identity element of L; (b) gv+t(x) = gv(gt(x)). 
3 Let DS1 = (M, (gt)t∈T) be a dynamical system on L = (T, +), and DS2 = (N, (hv)v∈V) be a 
dynamical system on P = (V, ⊕). An emulation function u of DS2 in DS1 is defined as 
follows (Giunti 2010a: sec. 2, 2014: sec. 2, Definition 8); u is an emulation of DS2 in DS1 := 
u is an injective function from N to M and, for any v ∈ V, for any c ∈ N, there is t ∈ T such 
that u(hv(c)) = gt(u(c)). Furthermore, we say that DS1 emulates DS2 just in case there is an 
emulation u of DS2 in DS1. 
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those details would admittedly be too complex. I believe that this kind of in 
principle solution is not in agreement with the question we have in mind 
when we ask what it means for a computational system to be realized by a 
physical one. This question does not ask for abstract in principle answers, 
but for detailed and concrete ones. For, in many cases, we can very well tell 
that a real system is a physical realization of a computational one, even 
though we do not have any low level description of the real system, nor do 
we even mention such description, think of, or make any reference to it. 
2. Computational systems as setup interpreted dynamical systems
My present strategy envisages that an adequate solution to the realization 
problem will emerge once the quite complex nature of computational 
systems is fully recognized and brought to light. According to this view, 
computational systems are more similar to empirically correct dynamical 
models than to dynamical systems tout court. Thus, the solution of the 
realization problem is to be sought among the modeling relations between 
dynamical systems and phenomena, and not among the emulation relations 
between purely mathematical dynamical systems.4 
In my view a computational system CS = (DS, H, IDS,H) is a complex 
object which consists of three parts. First, a mathematical part DS = 
(M, (gt)t∈T), which is a discrete5 n-component6 dynamical system.7 Second, a 
4 While emulation is the wrong kind of relation for an analysis of realization, emulation is 
indeed an adequate basis for a representational analysis of reduction of empirically 
interpreted dynamical systems (Giunti 2010a, 2014). The two issues are closely related but, 
in order to avoid conceptual confusion, they cannot be lumped together. The first one has to 
do with a relation between a computational system and its realizers, where each realizer is a 
concrete or real system. The second one deals with a relation between two mathematical 
dynamical systems, both of which are models of real phenomena. 
5 A dynamical system DS = (M, (gt)t∈T) is discrete := (i) the time model of DS is the 
additive monoid (T, +), where the time set T is either the set of the non-negative integers 
Z≥0 or the integers Z, and + is the usual operation of sum of two integers; (ii) the state space 
M is at most countably infinite (Giunti 2010a: sec. 2, 2014: sec. 2). 
6 For any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), let Xi be a non-empty set, and let DS = (M, (gt)t∈T) be a dynamical 
system whose state space M ⊆ X1× . . . ×Xn; for any i, the set Ci = {xi : for some n-tuple x ∈ 
M, xi is the i-th element of x} is called the i-th component of M, and DS is called an 
n-component dynamical system (Giunti 2014: sec. 4.1, 2016: Definition 2). 
7 The two requirements of (i) being a discrete dynamical system with (ii) a finite number of 
state space components make up a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the 
mathematical part DS of a computational system. The debate on which other requirements 
should be considered for an adequate definition of the purely mathematical part of a 
computational system is still open (Gandy 1980; Giunti 1997, 2006; Giunti & Giuntini 
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computational setup8 H = (F, BF), which is made up of a theoretical part F, 
and a real part BF. And, third, an interpretation IDS,H, which links the 
dynamical system DS with the setup H. 
2.1. The computational setup H 
Let us now see in more detail what the computational setup H = (F, BF) 
looks like. First, its theoretical part F is a functional description which 
provides a sufficiently detailed specification of: 
a) the internal constitution and organization, or functioning, of any real
system of a certain type ASF;
b) a causal scheme CSF of the external interactions of any real system of
type ASF. In particular, the description of the causal scheme CSF must
include the specification of:
(b.1) the initial conditions that an arbitrary temporal evolution of any
real system of type ASF must satisfy; 
(b.2) the boundary conditions during the whole subsequent evolution; 
(b.3) and, possibly, the final conditions under which the evolution 
terminates. 
Second, the real part BF of the computational setup H is the set of all 
real or concrete systems which satisfy the functional description F or, in 
other words, BF is the set of all real systems of type ASF whose temporal 
evolutions are all constrained by the causal scheme CSF. BF is called the 
realization domain9 (or application domain) of H. Any real system bF ∈ BF is 
called an F-realizer. 
As H = (F, BF) is a computational setup, any temporal evolution of an 
arbitrary F-realizer bF ∈ BF  proceeds in discrete time steps, which 
correspond to basic operation cycles of bF. A basic operation cycle can 
always be interpreted as the (serial or parallel) execution, by bF, of a finite 
2007; Sieg 1999, 2002a, 2002b; Shagrir 2002; Dershowitz & Gurevich 2008; Fano et al. 
2014). 
8 A computational setup is in fact a special kind of dynamical phenomenon, see Giunti 
(2010a: sec. 4, 2010b: Appendice, 2014: sec. 4.1, 2016: sec. 3). 
9 Since the functional description F typically contains several idealizations, no real system 
exactly satisfies F, but it rather fits F up to a certain degree. Thus, from a formal point of 
view, the realization domain BF of a computational setup H = (F, BF) would be more 
faithfully described as a fuzzy set. 
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number of instructions for symbol manipulation. Therefore, the temporal 
evolutions of an F-realizer are in fact its computations. 
A clear example of a computational setup is provided by a typical 
informal presentation of a Turing machine. An arbitrary Turing machine 
setup, HTM = (FTM, BFTM), is detailed below. 
FTM: Functional description of a Turing machine (theoretical part of a 
Turing machine setup HTM) 
(A) SPECIFICATION OF ANY REAL SYSTEM OF TURING MACHINE TYPE ASFTM 
A real system of Turing machine type ASFTM is made up of two main parts: 
an external part and an internal one. The external part consists of two 
devices. First, the external memory, which may be thought as a linear 
arrangement of a finite number of cells (e.g., a tape divided into squares). 
Each cell always contains exactly one symbol taken from a finite alphabet 
A = {b, a1, ... , am} of m+1 (m ≥ 1) different symbols. The number of cells is 
always finite, but new cells can be added as needed (see below), either to 
the left of the leftmost cell, or to the right of the rightmost one. However, 
when a cell is added, it always contains the special symbol b, called the 
blank. 
Second, a read/write/move head, which is a device that, at each instant, 
is located on exactly one cell of the external memory, and is capable of 
doing three operations: (1) read the symbol contained in the cell where it is 
located (scanned symbol), and send it to the control unit (in the internal 
part) to which it is constantly connected; (2) replace the scanned symbol 
with a symbol received from the control unit; (3) move one cell to the right, 
one cell to the left, or stay put, according to the moving command +1, −1, or 
0 that it receives from the control unit. If the head receives the command +1 
(−1) when it is located on the rightmost (leftmost) cell, it first adds one 
blank cell to the right (left), and then moves to the newly added cell. 
The internal part of the system also consists of two devices. First, an 
internal memory, which may be thought as a single cell that always contains 
exactly one symbol (internal state) taken from a finite alphabet Q = 
{q1, ... , qn} of n (n ≥ 1) different symbols. The internal memory is 
constantly connected to the control unit and, besides being just a container 
for an internal state, it is also capable of two operations: (1) read its internal 
state, and send it to the control unit; (2) replace its internal state with an 
internal state received from the control unit. 
The second internal device is a control unit, which is a deterministic 
input/output mechanism. Its inputs are state-symbol pairs qiaj, while its 
outputs are symbol-movement-state triples akXql. (X stands for one of the 
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three commands +1, −1, 0.) For any possible input pair qiaj, the control unit 
always responds with a fixed output triple akXql. The input-output behavior 
of the control unit is thus completely described by three finite tables, T1, 
T2, T3, in which each input pair qiaj is listed together with, respectively, the 
corresponding output symbol ak, the movement command X, or the new 
internal state ql. Both the symbol ak and the command X of an output triple 
are always sent to the head, while the new internal state ql is sent to the 
internal memory. 
An operation cycle of the whole system is as follows. First, the current 
internal state q and the symbol a in the cell where the head is located are 
simultaneously read and sent to the control unit, which responds with an 
output triple a’Xq’. Second, the new symbol a’ and the moving command X 
are sent to the head, which first replaces a with a’ and then moves according 
to X; at the same time, the new internal state q’ is sent to the internal 
memory, where it replaces q. The operation cycle is thus complete, and the 
system is ready to start a new cycle. 
(B) SPECIFICATION OF THE CAUSAL SCHEME CSFTM OF THE EXTERNAL 
INTERACTIONS OF ANY REAL SYSTEM OF TURING MACHINE TYPE ASFTM 
(1) Initial conditions. A sequence of operation cycles (i.e., a temporal 
evolution, or a computation) of a system of type ASFTM starts as soon 
as the following settings are performed: (i) an initial internal state is 
fixed, (ii) a symbol in each cell of the external memory is fixed, and 
(iii) the cell where the head is initially located is fixed. 
(2) Boundary conditions. During the whole subsequent computation 
there is no further interaction with the external environment. 
(3) Final conditions. The computation terminates immediately after an 
operation cycle that satisfies all the following conditions: (i) q’ = q, 
(ii) a’ = a, (iii) X = 0. 
BFTM : Realization domain (real part of a Turing machine setup HTM) 
The realization domain BFTM of a Turing machine setup HTM is the (fuzzy)10 
set of all real or concrete systems that satisfy the given specification of the 
Turing machine type ASFTM, and whose temporal evolutions all satisfy the 
given specification of the Turing machine interaction scheme CSFTM. Any 
system bFTM ∈ BFTM is called a Turing machine realizer.  
10 See footnote 9. 
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2.2. The discrete n-component dynamical system DS 
So far, we have mainly focused on the setup part H of a computational 
system. But, as mentioned above, a computational system is a complex 
object that also includes a purely mathematical part DS, and an 
interpretation IDS,H of the mathematical part DS on the setup H. In particular, 
we have seen that the mathematical part DS is a discrete n-component 
dynamical system. Let us now see what this dynamical system looks like in 
the special case of a Turing machine. An arbitrary Turing machine 
dynamical system, DSTM, is described below. 
An arbitrary Turing machine dynamical system DSTM 
From the purely mathematical point of view, an arbitrary Turing machine 
can be identified with the discrete, 3-component dynamical system DSTM = 
(Q×P×C, (gt)t∈Z≥0), which is the one completely specified by the difference 
equation stated below (Table 2.3). Note first that this dynamical system is 
discrete, for its time model is the additive monoid (Z≥0, +) of the non-
negative integers, and its state space Q×P×C is countably infinite (because 
of the finitary restriction on the functions in C, see next paragraph). 
Second, DSTM is a 3-component dynamical system, for its state space 
has the three components Q, P, and C. Q = {q1, ... , qn}, where qi is an 
arbitrary internal state of the Turing machine; P = Z is the set of all integers, 
which is intended to represent all the possible positions of the head, and C is 
the set of all functions c: P → {b, a1, ... , am} that satisfy the finitary 
restriction: c(x) ≠ b for at most finitely many x ∈ P. Any such function is 
intended to represent a possible content of the Turing machine external 
memory. Let us now consider the five variables and the six functions 
defined in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below. 
 
Table 2.1 The variables needed for describing an arbitrary Turing machine 
dynamical system DSTM = (Q×C×P, (gt)t∈Z≥0). 
Variable Domain State variable 
a A := {b, a1, ... , am} NO 
q Q := {q1, ... , qn} YES 
p P := Z, the integers YES 
c 
C := the set of all functions c: P → A 
such that c( p) ≠ b for at most finitely 
many p ∈ P 
YES 
m M := {−1, 0, +1} NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184  Reasoning, Metaphor and Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then, an arbitrary Turing machine dynamical system is the 
3-component discrete dynamical system DSTM := (Q×P×C, (gt)t∈Z≥0), whose 
time set is Z≥0, whose state space is Q×P×C, and whose family of state 
transition functions (gt : Q×P×C → Q×P×C)t∈Z≥0 is defined by the 
3-component difference equation shown in Table 2.3.11 
 
 
Function Codomain Definition 
READ(c, p) A READ(c, p) := c( p) 
WRITE(a, c, p) C 
WRITE(a, c, p) := c’ ∈ C such that, for 
any x ∈ P , if x = p, c’(x) = a; 
else, c’(x) = c(x) 
MOVE( p, m) P MOVE( p, m) := p + m 
A(q, a) A A(q, a) := for any q and a, A(q, a) is listed in a given finite table T1 
M(q, a) M M(q, a) := for any q and a, M(q, a) is listed in a given finite table T2 
Q(q, a) Q Q(q, a) := for any q and a, Q(q, a) is listed in a given finite table T3 
Table 2.2 The functions needed for describing an arbitrary Turing machine 
dynamical system DSTM = (Q×C×P, (gt)t∈Z≥0). 
 
 
State variable Difference equation 
q q’ = Q(q, READ(c, p)) 
p p’ = MOVE( p, M(q, READ(c, p))) 
c c’ = WRITE(A(q, READ(c, p)), c, p) 
Table 2.3 The 3-component difference equation that univocally individuates 
an arbitrary Turing machine dynamical system DSTM = (Q×C×P, (gt)t∈Z≥0). 
2.3. The interpretation IDS, H 
The final step of my analysis focuses on the nature and role of the third part 
of a computational system, that is, the interpretation IDS,H of the 
mathematical part DS on the computational setup H. Let DS = (M, (gt)t∈T) 
                                                 
11 More precisely, the family of state transition functions (gt: Q×P×C → Q×P×C)t∈Z≥0 is 
defined as follows: (i) g0 is the identity function; (ii) g1 is the function defined by the 3-
component difference equation in Table 2.3; for any t ∈ Z≥1, gt is the t-th iteration of g1. 
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be a discrete n-component dynamical system, and H = (F, BF) be a 
computational setup. An interpretation IDS,H of DS on H consists in stating 
that (i) each component Ci of the state space M is included in, or is equal to, 
the set V(Mi) of all the possible values of a magnitude Mi of setup H, and 
(ii) the time set T of DS is equal to the set V(T) of all the possible values of 
the time magnitude T of setup H.12 In other words, an interpretation IDS,H 
can always be identified with a particular set of n+1 statements. We thus 
define: 
IDS,H is an interpretation of DS on H := IDS,H = {C1 ⊆ V(M1), ... , Cn ⊆ 
V(Mn), T = V(T)}, where Ci is the i-th component of M, Mi is a magnitude 
of the setup H, V(Mi) is the set of all possible values of Mi, T is the time 
magnitude of H and, for any i and j, if i ≠ j, then Mi ≠ Mj. 
For example, let us consider a Turing machine dynamical system    
DSTM := (Q×P×C, (gt)t∈Z≥0) and a Turing machine setup HTM = (FTM, BFTM). 
Then, the intended interpretation of DSTM on HTM is described below. 
 
The intended interpretation of DSTM on HTM 
Let Q be the content of the internal memory of an arbitrary Turing machine 
realizer bFTM ∈ BFTM; then, Q = V(Q). 
Let P be the position of the head of bFTM. The head position is always 
individuated by the cell where it is located; as the cells are linearly arranged 
and their number is finite, if we choose one of them as the origin, we obtain 
a one-one correspondence between the cells and an initial segment of Z (in 
either the positive or the negative direction). Once such an integer 
coordinate system is fixed, an arbitrary possible value of P can be identified 
with the coordinate of the cell where the head is located; thus, V(P) = Z = P. 
Let C be the whole content of the external memory of bFTM, i.e., the 
distribution of symbols over each of its cells. Then, with respect to the fixed 
integer coordinate system for the cells (see previous paragraph), an arbitrary 
                                                 
12 In general, we take a magnitude of a computational setup H = (F, BF) to be a property Mj 
of every F-realizer bF ∈ BF such that, at different instants, it can assume different values. 
The set of all possible values of magnitude Mj is indicated by V(Mj). We further assume 
that, among the magnitudes of any computational setup H, there always is its time 
magnitude, which we denote by T. The set of all possible values (instants or durations) of 
the time magnitude of H is indicated by V(T), Since the time of a computational setup 
evolves in discrete steps that correspond to its basic operation cycles, we take V(T ) = Z≥0 
(or V(T ) = Z, only if the setup is reversible). 
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possible value of magnitude C can be thought as any of the functions 
c ∈ C;13 therefore, C = V(C). 
Finally, let T be the temporal ordering according to which an arbitrary 
temporal evolution of bFTM occurs. Since any such evolution is in fact a 
sequence of successive operation cycles, each operation cycle corresponds 
to a non-negative integer; thus, Z≥0 = V(T). 
In short, the intended interpretation of DSTM on HTM consists of the 
following set of four identities. 
IDSTM,HTM  := {Q = V(Q), P = V(P), C = V(C), Z≥0 = V(T)}. 
 
Turing machines as setup interpreted dynamical systems 
Finally, as a typical example of a computational system, we can define a 
Turing machine as follows. 
TM is a Turing machine := TM is a triple (DSTM, HTM , IDSTM,HTM), where 
DSTM = (Q×C×Z, (gt)t∈Z≥0) is a Turing machine dynamical system, HTM = 
(FTM, BFTM) is a Turing machine setup, IDSTM,HTM is the intended interpretation 
of DSTM on HTM , and the three tables T1, T2, T3 which, respectively, define 
the three functions A, M, Q of DSTM are identical to the three tables T1, T2, 
T3 that completely describe the input-output behavior of the control unit of 
an arbitrary real system of Turing machine type ASFTM, as specified by the 
functional description FTM of setup HTM.  
3. Physical realizations of a computational system 
Once an interpretation IDS,H = {C1 ⊆ V(M1), ... , Cn ⊆	V(Mn), T = V(T)} is 
given, we define the possible states of the setup H = (F, BF) as follows. 
x is a possible state of H relative to IDS,H := x ∈ V(M1)× ... ×V(Mn). 
V(M1)× ... ×V(Mn) is called the state space of H relative to IDS,H, and is 
indicated by M. 
The interpretation IDS,H also allows us to define the instantaneous state 
of an arbitrary F-realizer of H. Let bF ∈ BF be an arbitrary F-realizer of setup 
H, and j ∈ T an arbitrary instant. Then: 
x is the state of bF at instant j relative to IDS,H := x = (x1, ... , xn), where 
xi is the value at instant j ∈ T of magnitude Mi of bF (if, at instant j, such a 
value exists). 
                                                 
13 Recall that, for any c ∈ C, c: Z → A = {b, a1, ..., am}. 
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Obviously, if x is the state of bF at instant j, then x ∈ M. Note, however, 
that, depending on the instant j, the value of magnitude Mi of bF may not 
exist.14 If this happens, the state of bF at instant j relative to IDS,H is not 
defined. 
Now, relative to the interpretation IDS,H, we may define the set CF of all 
those possible states of H (if any) that actually are initial states of H. 
CF := {x : for some bF ∈ BF, for some temporal evolution e of bF, for 
some j ∈ T, j is the initial instant of e and x is the state of bF at j relative to 
IDS,H}. CF is called the set of all initial states of H, relative to interpretation 
IDS,H. 
Intuitively, the set CF may be thought as the set of all those states in M 
that are consistent with the initial conditions specified by the causal scheme 
CSF and are in fact initial states of some realizer bF ∈ BF. Also note that, 
depending on the interpretation IDS,H, CF may be empty, or CF may not be a 
subset of the state space M of DS.15 The definition of an admissible 
interpretation (see below) will exclude these somewhat pathological 
interpretations. 
Let CF ≠ ∅. Let us now define, with respect to interpretation IDS,H, the 
set of all initial instants of the evolutions of a given F-realizer bF ∈ BF, 
whose initial state x ∈ CF be fixed. We call this set JbF,x . 
JbF,x := { jbF, x : jbF,x is the initial instant of some evolution of bF, and x is 
the state of bF at instant jbF,x}. JbF,x is called the set of the initial instants of 
bF whose initial state is x, relative to IDS,H. 
Note that, for some bF ∈ BF and x ∈ CF, JbF,x may be empty.16 However, 
by the definition of CF, for any x ∈ CF, there is bF ∈ BF such that JbF,x ≠ ∅. 
As the setup H is usually taken to be deterministic, the existence and 
identity of the instantaneous state, at any fixed stage of an evolution of any 
realizer bF, is not intended to depend on either the initial instant, or the 
                                                 
14 If, for some reason, bF no longer exists at instant j ∈ T, then a fortiori the value at j of 
magnitude Mi of bF does not exist either. Furthermore, we are not making any assumption 
about the continuous existence of the values of a magnitude during any interval of time. 
Thus, it is in principle possible that the value of magnitude Mi of bF exists at some instant j 
of bF’s existence, but does not exist at some other instant k of its existence. 
15 In fact, by the definition of instantaneous state, CF is empty if, for any bF ∈ BF and any 
state evolution e of bF, some magnitude Mi does not have a value at the initial instant of e. 
Also recall that, according to interpretation IDS,H, each component Ci of the state space M is 
in general a subset of V(M i). Thus, if for some x ∈ CF, its i-th component xi ∈ V(M i) is not 
a member of Ci, then CF ⊈ M. 
16 In fact, JbF, x is empty if x is not the state of bF at the initial instant of any of its evolutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188  Reasoning, Metaphor and Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
identity of bF, but only on the initial state. Thus, any admissible 
interpretation IDS,H should at least ensure that the condition below holds. 
Condition D (Determinism). For any bF, dF ∈ BF, for any x ∈ CF, for 
any jbF,x ∈ JbF,x, for any kdF,x ∈ JdF,x, for any t ∈ T, if t + jbF,x is an instant of the 
evolution of bF that starts at jbF,x and the state of bF at instant t + jbF,x exists, 
then t + kdF,x is an instant of the evolution of cF that starts at kdF,x, the state of 
cF at instant t + kdF,x exists as well, and the state of bF at instant t + jbF,x = the 
state of dF at instant t + kdF,x. 
Let CF ≠ ∅. For any initial state x ∈ CF, let us consider the set of all 
F-realizers whose initial state is x. This set, denoted by BFx, is in other words 
the collection of all F-realizers bF whose set JbF, x is not empty. Note that 
also this definition, as the previous ones, depends on the interpretation IDS,H. 
BFx := {bF ∈ BF such that JbF, x ≠ ∅}. BFx is called the set of all 
F-realizers whose initial state is x, relative to interpretation IDS,H. 
We noticed above that, for any x ∈ CF, there is bF ∈ BF such that 
JbF, x ≠ ∅. Therefore, by the definition just stated, for any x ∈ CF, BFx ≠ ∅. 
Suppose CF ≠ ∅. Then, for any x ∈ CF, for any bF ∈ BFx, for any jbF,x ∈ 
JbF,x, we define the following set of durations: 
qbF, jbF, x(x) := {t: t ∈ T, t + jbF,x is an instant of the evolution of bF that 
starts at jbF,x, and there is y ∈ M such that y is the state of bF at t + jbF,x, 
relative to IDS,H}. 
Note that this definition, like the previous ones, is relative to the 
interpretation IDS,H. Furthermore, qbF, jbF, x(x) ≠ ∅, for 0 ∈ qbF, jbF, x(x). 
Also note that, whenever Condition D above holds, qbF, jbF, x(x) depends 
on x, but does not depend on either bF or jbF,x; therefore, if Condition D 
holds, we simply write “qF(x)” instead of “qbF, jbF, x(x)”. 
By Condition D and the previous definition, for any x ∈ CF, qF(x) is the 
set of all durations t that transform the initial state x of an arbitrary 
F-realizer bF ∈ BFx into some other state of bF. More briefly, we call qF(x) 
the set of all durations that transform the initial state x of H into some other 
state. 
As we are not interested in any interpretation IDS,H such that (a) CF = ∅, 
or (b) CF ⊈ M, or (c) Condition D does not hold17, we define: 
                                                 
17 If either (a), (b), or (c), the interpretation IDS, H, is obviously incorrect, for: if (a) holds, no 
evolution of any F-realizer bF can be represented by means of the state transition family 
(gt)t∈T of DS = (M, (gt)t∈T); if (b) holds, some evolution of some F-realizer bF cannot be 
represented by (gt)t∈T ; if (c) holds, some evolution of some F-realizer bF cannot be 
correctly represented by (gt)t∈T. 
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IDS,H is an admissible interpretation of DS on H := (i) CF ≠ ∅ and 
(ii) CF ⊆ M and (iii) Condition D holds. 
We can now precisely state the conditions for an interpretation IDS,H to 
be correct. The intuitive idea is this. As soon as an interpretation IDS,H is 
fixed, the dynamical system DS = (M, (gt)t∈T) provides us with a 
representation of the real systems (F-realizers) in the realization domain of 
computational setup H. Such a representation is in fact provided by the state 
transition family (gt)t∈T of dynamical system DS. The interpretation IDS,H 
will thus turn out to be correct if the representation, provided by (gt)t∈T, of 
all temporal evolutions of all F-realizers of H is correct. This intuitive idea 
is formally expressed by the definition below. 
IDS,H is a correct interpretation of DS on H := (i) IDS,H is an admissible 
interpretation of DS on H and (ii) for any x ∈ CF, for any t ∈ qF(x), for any 
bF ∈ BFx , for any jbF,x ∈ JbF,x, gt(x) = the state of bF at instant t + jbF,x relative 
to IDS,H. 
Let CS = (DS, H, IDS,H) be a computational system, and BF be the 
realization domain of H. We can thus finally define: 
b is a physical realization of CS := b ∈ BF and IDS,H is a correct 
interpretation of DS on H. 
It is now easy to prove that, in the special but important case of an 
arbitrary Turing machine TM, the intended interpretation IDSTM,HTM of the 
Turing machine dynamical system DSTM on the Turing machine setup HTM  
is indeed a correct interpretation of DSTM on HTM , so that any Turing 
machine realizer bFTM ∈ BFTM turns out to be a physical realization of TM, and 
conversely. 
 
Theorem 
If TM = (DSTM, HTM , IDSTM,HTM) is a Turing machine, then IDSTM,HTM 
is a correct interpretation of DSTM on HTM . 
Proof 
The thesis is a straightforward consequence of the definitions of 
Turing machine and correct interpretation of DS on H, in 
conjunction with the theoretical part FTM of the Turing machine 
setup HTM, the specification of DSTM, and the intended 
interpretation IDSTM,HTM.  Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 
For any Turing machine TM, b is a physical realization of TM 
iff b ∈ BFTM. 
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Proof 
By the previous Theorem and the definition of physical 
realization of a computational system.  Q.E.D. 
4. Concluding remarks 
It is my contention that the previous Theorem is not peculiar to Turing 
machines, but that an analogous theorem holds for each specific type of 
computational system (for instance, finite automata, register machines, 
cellular automata, and so on). If this is true, all computational systems are 
then characterized by a form of a-priori (or purely theoretical) 
interpretation of the mathematical part on the setup part, for the correctness 
of the interpretation can be proved. The a-priori character of the 
interpretation of a computational system distinguishes this kind of system 
from ordinary dynamical models of phenomena (Giunti 2010a: sec. 4, 
2010b: Appendice, 2014: sec. 4.1, 2016: secs. 3 and 4), as found in 
empirical science. In fact, for this second kind of dynamical system, the 
correctness of the interpretation of the mathematical part on the intended 
phenomenon (which is the analog of the setup of a computational system) 
cannot be established a-priori—cannot be proved—but only a-posteriori or 
empirically. 
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